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Abstract 
The article revisits the tradition of religious socialism as a potential resource for the 
information age. It begins with a detailed exposition and defence of the ideas of network 
society theorist Manuel Castells. However, the article questions Castells’ reliance on 
contemporary social movements as a response to what he calls the bipolar opposition 
between the net and the self. Arguing for a more universal and ontological solution, it seeks 
to reappropriate the nineteenth-century Christian socialism of Maurice, Ludlow and Kingsley, 
specifically their powerful doctrine of mere brotherhood. Updated as the fellowship of the net, 
the brotherhood and sisterhood of humankind under the fatherhood of God turns into an 
attractive and plausible twenty-first century ideal. 
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Introduction 
The world is undergoing a fundamental socio-technical transition from industrial societies to 
a global information society. A central feature of the new dispensation is the popularity of 
computerized social networks, especially Facebook,2 evidence that individuals are welcoming 
the latest digital means of expressing a capacity for sociality. At a deeper level, these 
networks contribute to the growing sense that human solidarity has become again a desirable 
and achievable aim. Brand Facebook may one day suffer the fate of precursors Friendster and 
MySpace, but the striving for greater ‘connectedness’ that it represents is unlikely to fade. 
Unfortunately, another, equally palpable but entirely antithetical characteristic of the 
information age is a countervailing trend towards disconnectedness and dissociation. 
Disliking is as common as liking; indeed, the world sometimes appears more fractured than 
ever. So network society presents a paradox, and a worldwide social problem.  
To some extent this was scripted by social scientist and futurist Daniel Bell in his 
epoch-defining work, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. 3  Bell anticipated networks 
becoming an important mode of working, and modern life turning increasingly integrated and 
interpersonal, a metamorphosis in which he assigned computer-telecommunications a central 
role. He also discerned problems, what he would famously call ‘the cultural contradictions of 
capitalism’. 4  However, it is to a second-generation information society theorist, Manuel 
Castells, that the task has fallen of sharpening the definition of the new social form and of 
explicating its underlying logic. The axial structure of the information age for Castells is 
indeed the network, and across all realms of human activity. However, Castells is also acutely 
                                                          
2 According to the company, Facebook had 1.86 billion ‘monthly active users’ as of 31 December 2016 
(http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ accessed 25 February 2017). This is roughly a quarter of the world’s 
population. 
3 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1999 [1973]). 
4 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996 [1976]). 
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aware that informatization throws into relief the condition of persons, communities and 
nations excluded from dominant networks. The ensuing conflict, as Castells frames it, and a 
potential solution, are the subject of the present inquiry. 
The article begins with a systematic exposition of Castells’ position, indicating key 
ways in which he has moved the needle forwards as regards our understanding of the post-
industrial era. It then argues that while Castells’ diagnosis of the network society’s condition 
is persuasive, his prescription is not. The millennium, it will claim, demands a broader human 
platform for connectivity than the progressive social movements upon which Castells pins his 
hopes. To that end, the article argues for a reinstatement of the largely forgotten doctrine of 
the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God; suitably updated, such an ideal can help 
to counter the threat, and redeem the promise, of network society. The article is thus offered 
as an exercise in what information society theorist and public theologian5 David Lyon terms 
the ‘hermeneutic of retrieval’.6  
Manuel Castells: the information society as (anti-)network society 
‘The information technology revolution’, Castells asserts at the start of The Rise of the 
Network Society, the first volume of his influential trilogy The Information Age, ‘because of 
its pervasiveness throughout the whole realm of human activity, will be my entry point in 
analyzing the complexity of the new economy, society, and culture in the making’.7 He is 
quick to add that he is no technological determinist, not only because, as per textbook social 
science, technological and societal factors operate reciprocally, but also because, in an 
                                                          
5 I define ‘public theologians’ broadly as scholars, of any disciplinary or interdisciplinary orientation and any 
faith, who apply their convictions explicitly to public affairs. Having had the privilege of making his 
acquaintance not long before his death, I feel sure that Duncan Forrester (1933-2016), at least, would have 
heartily concurred. A more sophisticated account can be found in, for example, Eneida Jacobsen, ‘Models of 
Public Theology’, International Journal of Public Theology, 6:1 (2012), 7-22. 
6 David Lyon, in Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013), p. 146. 
7 Manuel Castells, The Information Age, Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), p. 5. 
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unusual twist, ‘technology is society’, in the sense that ‘society cannot be understood or 
represented without its technological tools’.8 Thus, the ‘new technological paradigm’, mainly 
‘constituted’ in the United States, and in Silicon Valley in particular, both caused and was 
caused by the ‘fundamental process of restructuring of the capitalist system from the 1980s 
onwards’.9 The outcome of these interactions is nothing less than a new ‘techno-economic 
paradigm’.10 
Castells does not overlook Bell’s firm analytical distinction between levels of 
technological development and types of economic system;11 in principle, the information 
revolution still offers a free choice between ‘capitalism and statism’. However, commenting 
approximately a quarter of a century after Coming, Castells feels driven to register 
neoliberalism’s global near-hegemony in the information age. Hence, the ‘new social 
structure is associated with the emergence of a new mode of development, informationalism, 
historically shaped by the restructuring of the capitalist mode of production towards the end 
of the twentieth century’.12 
Castells also advances beyond the Bellian benchmark by bringing to the fore and 
making definitive an aspect of post-industrialism upon which his precursor could only touch. 
The new economy, Castells writes, ‘is networked because, under the new historical 
conditions, productivity is generated through and competition is played out in a global 
network of interaction between business networks’. And not just the economy: networks have 
become the standard ‘organizational form’. 13  As its title indicates, Rise of the Network 
Society is devoted to an elucidation of this ‘new organizational logic’,14 a logic that embraces, 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p. 4. 
9 Ibid., pp. 4, 13. 
10 Ibid., p. 4. 
11 Bell, Coming, p. 114. 
12 Castells, Network Society, p. 14. 
13 Ibid., p. 77. 
14 Ibid., p. 164. 
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inter alia, network enterprises, inter-firm networking, transnational corporations, television 
networks, virtual networks, and, of course, the internet itself. Network society supersedes the 
massive structures—mass production, mass media, ‘the masses’ of leftist rhetoric—of 
industrial society. It is characterized instead by affiliation, interactivity, horizontal as opposed 
to vertical communications, flows not fixtures, and instantaneity rather than linear time. The 
essential point is that the network society is about connectivity: ‘all the ways’, in Trevor 
Haywood’s plainer words, ‘that we communicate and transact and all the environments, real 
and virtual, that we construct to do these things’.15 The treatise concludes as magisterially as 
it began: 
Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of 
networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of 
production, experience, power, and culture. While the networking form of social 
organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology 
paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire 
social structure.16 
There is a problem, however. Although networks are typically ‘open’, ‘dynamic’ and 
‘expanding’,17 they are not necessarily inclusive, and in any case not everyone wants to 
belong to the dominant systems. On the contrary, indeed, Castells writes, ‘the new social 
order, the network society, increasingly appears to most people as a meta-social disorder’.18 
This basic theme, of a major disconnect between function-system and meaning-experience, is 
the central message of the whole trilogy. ‘Global networks of instrumental exchanges’, 
according to the prologue, ‘selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, and 
                                                          
15 Trevor Haywood, Only Connect: Shaping Networks and Knowledge for the New Millennium (London: 
Bowker-Saur, 1999), p. xiv. 
16 Castells, Network Society, p. 500. 
17 Ibid., p. 501. 
18 Ibid., p. 508. 
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even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network, in 
a relentless flow of strategic decisions’. ‘There follows’, the theorist continues, ‘a 
fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism, and historically rooted, 
particularistic identities. Our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition 
between the Net and the self’.19 
The second volume, The Power of Identity, starts by restating the issue. ‘Networks of 
wealth, information, and power’ are currently ‘programmed’ by certain ‘values and interests’, 
those of ‘capitalist globalization’, the end-result being ‘domination’.20 Sadly, this is ‘the one-
dimensional logic that dominates the network society in the first stage of its constitution’. 
However, dominant networks do not have everything their own way. Over-against them, we 
find ‘resistance’ carried on by numerous ‘social movements’, representing forms of ‘cultural 
identity’.21 The rise of the network society, as Castells grandly puts it, has prompted ‘the 
widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization 
and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives 
and environment’.22 These movements, as various as religious fundamentalism, nationalist 
insurgencies and human-rights and environmentalist activism, provide a shared sense of 
meaning. Their antagonistic relationship with the system is the heart of Castells’ theory in 
The Information Age and related works.23 
Castells’ account of identity specifies three types: legitimizing, resistance and project. 
The first is our official identity. It is ‘introduced by the dominant institutions of society to 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 Manuel Castells, The Information Age, Vol. 2: The Power of Identity, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 
xv-xvii. 
21 Ibid., pp. xv-xvi. 
22 Ibid., p. 2. 
23 See, for example, Manuel Castells and Pekka Himanen, The Information Society and the Welfare State: The 
Finnish Model (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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extend and rationalize their domination’.24 Originated at state level, this form of identity 
operates through the institutions of civil society, democratic citizenship being a prime 
example. Resistance identity, by contrast, is ‘generated by those actors who are in 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination’. Reacting 
defensively, it leads to the ‘formation of communes, or communities’ that ‘revers[e] the 
[negative] value judgement while reinforcing the boundary’ between insiders and outsiders 
on the network.25  Examples include communities based on ethnicity, such as nationalist 
movements, and others predicated on religion, such as Islamism. Project identity, the third 
and putatively final type, appears ‘when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural 
materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society 
and, by so doing, seek the transformation of the overall social structure’.26 Feminism, with its 
bid to overthrow patriarchal hierarchy, is one of Castells’ favourite manifestations of project 
identity, as is the environmental movement.  
Castells contends that social institutions, including the state, are now caught between 
the global networks and these contrarian movements, to the extent of being ‘shaken in their 
foundations and challenged in their legitimacy’.27 In short, legitimizing identity is losing out 
to resistance and project identities. And the future belongs to the latter, Castells believes—
much as Marx believed it lay with the industrial proletariat and Bell with a new knowledge 
class. ‘I would argue’, he writes, ‘that, given the structural crisis of civil society and the 
nation-state, this [project identity] may be the main potential source of social change in the 
network society’.28 Castells is persuaded that his extensive fieldwork outside the corridors, or 
rather networks, of power, has furnished genuine grounds for optimism. ‘It is in these back 
                                                          
24 Castells, Power of Identity, p. 8. 
25 Ibid., p. 9 
26 Ibid., p. 10. 
27 Ibid., p. xv. 
28 Ibid., p. 70. 
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alleys of society’, he enthuses at the end of volume two, after referencing environmentalism 
and feminism, ‘whether in alternative electronic networks or in grassrooted networks of 
communal resistance, that I have sensed the embryos of a new society, labored in the fields of 
history by the power of identity’.29  
Volume three, End of Millennium, has been much less visible in the vast literature 
citing The Information Age, but it is theoretically and even politically important for its 
exposure of the ‘fourth world’, a tragic dimension of the new reality unleashed by network 
society. This social realism is another quality that makes Castells’ work an advance on 
Coming. To be fair, Bell had ended his venture in social forecasting with a mild warning that 
‘the politics of the future will not be the quarrels between functional economic-interest 
groups for distributive shares of the national product, but the concerns of a communal society, 
particularly the inclusion of disadvantaged groups’.30 However, Castells makes the plight of 
the oppressed central to post-industrialism. The ‘rise of informationalism at the turn of the 
millennium’, he reports, ‘is intertwined with rising inequality and social exclusion throughout 
the world’. He proceeds: 
The processing of capitalist restructuring, with its hardened logic of economic 
competitiveness, has much to do with it. But new technological and organizational 
conditions of the Information Age, as analyzed in this book, provide a new, powerful 
twist to the old pattern of profit-seeking taking over soul-searching.31 
‘Inequality, polarization, poverty, and misery’, alongside ‘individualization of work, 
over-exploitation of workers, social exclusion, and perverse integration’: these are all social 
evils which have ‘systemic relationships’—the former in the domain of consumption, the 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 428. 
30 Bell, Coming, pp. 366-7. 
31 Manuel Castells, The Information Age, Vol. 3: End of Millennium, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), p. 69. 
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latter in production—with information capitalism. 32  Castells explains Africa’s de facto 
excommunication from the global system as a function of its lagging-behind in information 
technology. He interprets the spread, particularly in Asia, of the exploitation of children, as 
an example of network society’s perverted accommodation of criminal networks. However, 
his focus is not just the soft target of third-world countries. Castells also foregrounds the 
predicament of people inside the developed world, not least the inner-city ghettos of 
‘informational America’.33 All such, pace the information society’s apologists, are part of a 
‘new world, the Fourth World, [that] has emerged, made up of multiple black holes of social 
exclusion throughout the planet’.34 
It is perhaps too early to endorse the judgement of those who rushed to compare 
Castells to the nineteenth-century masters of social theory.35 However, the scope of his work 
is certainly comparable. 36  If some of his specific propositions and their relations lack 
mathematical precision, to have even attempted a synoptic view is laudable. Moreover, the 
thrust of the analysis is highly plausible. Castells has grasped that information technology, 
and the ubiquitous telecommunications infrastructure that it has afforded, is a bona fide 
game-changer which in combination with other factors is revolutionizing the economies, 
cultures and to some extent polities of the twenty-first century, not just for the rich nations 
trumpeted by Bell and his generation, but globally. The Information Age presents a dramatic, 
almost eschatological and yet also instantly familiar image of a wired world in the throes of a 
multiform normative crisis. Its author evidently has his finger on the post-industrial pulse, 
deducing therefrom the sociocultural contradictions between the net, that is, the restricted 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p. 70. 
33 Ibid., p. 136. 
34 Ibid., p. 169. 
35 See, for example, Anthony Giddens, ‘Out of Place’, The Times Higher Education Supplement, 13 December 
(1996), 18.  
36 For detailed studies of the network society, see David Barney, The Network Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004); Felix Stalder, Manuel Castells: The Theory of the Network Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Jan 
Van Dijk, The Network Society, 3rd edn (London: Sage, 2012). 
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circuitry of an informatized money/power elite, and the peripheralized identities of the 
ordinary self.  
However, while Castells is fully sensitive to the crisis, he is unable to provide a 
solution. Like Bell and many other heralds of the information age, he politely dismisses the 
working class as an obsolete product of the industrial revolution, no longer positioned to 
serve as principal agent of change. In its stead, in the world’s backstreets, as noted, Castells 
claims to have spotted the ‘embryos’ of a better society, lurking among the ‘grassroots’ in 
alternative digital networks and communities. However, his hopes of salvation, vested in 
project identities that happen to be close to his own heart, are too narrowly- and subjectively-
based. On inspection, in fact, his philosophical sociology can be seen pivoting unsustainably 
on a binary, and simplistic, deontic logic: environmentalism good, capitalism bad; feminism 
good, religion bad; and so on. Notwithstanding the industrious empirical effort undergirding 
it, The Information Age looks normatively like nothing so much as a snapshot of the world 
from a Berkeley seminar room circa 1968. 
Recent work by Castells does not materially change this picture. For example, 
Networks of Outrage and Hope, a commentary on the Arab Spring, Occupy and related 
phenomena, concludes with the optimistic, but vague, assertion that ‘the legacy of [these] 
networked social movements will have been to raise the possibility of re-learning how to live 
together’.37 But the question is how, given that most people were, are, and forever shall be 
outside such organizations, which in some cases are themselves profoundly divided, can such 
a reconciliation really be achieved—a togetherness, to adopt 1960s language, of the whole 
society? By what motive power can network society actually be propelled to a higher stage of 
its ‘constitution’? 
                                                          
37 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012), p. 246. 
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The situation calls for something far more fundamental than identity projects. A 
reliance on social movements cannot avail, because, as has been pointed out in another 
context, such an approach ‘encourages instead the perception that fraternity is an inherently 
sectarian, exclusive value, intelligible only in relation to particularized communities whose 
members derive a sense of identity and common cause from belonging to them’.38 So what a 
contemporary mission for a progressive information society demands is the wider, firmer 
platform of a universal ideal of connectivity. The major theorist of the network society does 
not appear to offer anything of the kind. However, if one looks closely enough, the clue is 
actually lying right there in the entrails of the text. ‘If’, speculates the very last page of End of 
Millennium, ‘humankind feels the solidarity of the species throughout the globe...’39 That is 
the crux of the problem: we need to find cultural resources that might promote the 
connectedness of the entire human race. We must therefore locate a fourth species of identity 
that can perform a normative function for the network society as a totality. I will argue next 
that such a resource is already available in the form of a spiritual identity anchored in the 
ontological reality of human siblinghood.  
Christian socialism: the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God 
This section seeks to resurrect a little-known school of nineteenth-century thought. Essays in 
retrieval are not unusual in information society studies, as illustrated by uses of Jeremy 
Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ as a benchmark for the critique of surveillance40 or citations of Max 
Weber and Emile Durkheim in an analysis of the process of mediation. 41  As regards 
                                                          
38 Colin Bird, ‘Fraternity’, in Michael T. Gibbons, ed., The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2014), pp. 1368–70 at p. 1369. 
39 Castells, End of Millennium, p. 396. 
40 See, for example, Sami Coll, ‘Power, Knowledge, and the Subjects of Privacy: Understanding Privacy as the 
Ally of Surveillance’, Information, Communication and Society, 17:10 (2014), 1250-63; David Lyon, ed., 
Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 1996); Eric Stoddart, 
Theological Perspectives on a Surveillance Society: Watching and Being Watched (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
41 Ralph Schroeder and Rich Ling, ‘Durkheim and Weber on the Social Implications of New Information and 
Communication Technologies’, New Media and Society, 16:5 (2014), 789-805. 
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normative political philosophies, while there has been occasional work on other schools, most 
of the focus has been on Marxism. Given the scale of Karl Marx’s influence this was 
predictable, and some neo-Marxian applications are duly noticed below. However, I wish to 
make the case instead for listening to another Victorian voice, one that might have been stiller 
and smaller but which was nevertheless highly resonant in its day, namely, Christian 
socialism. My hypothesis, counter-intuitive though it may initially feel, is that from that 
obscure quarter can be extracted normative resources—one in particular—of the first 
importance for the Castellsian information age.  
The Christian socialist movement has been ably chronicled elsewhere, 42  but the 
essentials are as follows. Formed in London in 1848, it had three founders: John Ludlow, a 
Franco-British lawyer who had witnessed that year’s popular insurrection in Paris; Frederick 
Denison Maurice, an Anglican clergyman and emerging theologian; and Charles Kingsley the 
novelist, also a cleric. They were soon joined by Thomas Hughes, barrister, novelist and 
member of parliament, and Edward Vansittart Neale, a landed aristocrat who largely funded 
the movement. What united these individuals was a conviction that orthodox Christian faith 
contained latent socialist values, and that the church should therefore offer practical support 
to fledgling popular causes. Their ideas found expression in a range of genres, notably 
newspapers Politics for the People (1848) and The Christian Socialist (1850-1), and a series 
of pamphlets, Tracts on Christian Socialism (1850). Also influential in the long run was their 
didactic fiction, especially Kingsley’s Alton Locke: Tailor and Poet (1850) and Hughes’ Tom 
Brown’s Schooldays (1857). Significant mature works included Ludlow and Henry Jones’ 
Progress of the Working Class (1867), Hughes and Neale’s Ethics and Economics of the Co-
operative Movement (1879) and Ludlow’s Autobiography of a Christian Socialist (1899). It is 
                                                          
42 See, especially, Philip N. Backstrom, Christian Socialism and Co-operation in Victorian England: Edward 
Vansittart Neale and the Co-operative Movement (London: Croom Helm, 1974); Torben Christensen, Origin 
and History of Christian Socialism, 1848-54 (Aarhus: Unversitetsforlaget i Aarhus, 1962); Edward Norman, The 
Victorian Christian Socialists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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an impressive corpus, parts of which found their way into the canon of British democratic-
socialist thought.43  
The principal source, however, of Christian socialism is an earlier work by Maurice, 
the movement’s spiritual leader. His Kingdom of Christ originated in 1834 as a series of 
dialogues with a Quaker, before developing in its second edition (1842) into a comprehensive 
theologico-political treatise. It is easy to see why a clergyman with left-wing sympathies 
might have found Quakerism inspiring. The denomination was internationalist, eschewing 
imperialism and war, as well as egalitarian as regards women and minorities. Moreover, in a 
pre-democratic age it had already rejected the principle of autocracy: it had no pope, no 
clergy, no central structure. Its only problem, for Maurice as for most Christians then and 
now, was its implausible claim that the ‘Society of Friends’, as Quakers styled themselves, 
was co-extensive with the kingdom of God on earth. Dismissing such narrowness, Maurice 
contended that such a kingdom long predated the organization set up by ‘[Charles] Fox, the 
shoemaker of the 17th century’.44 It was none other than the catholic—with a small ‘c’—
church, the global community that Jesus Christ had inaugurated nearly two millennia 
previously. Maurice lays out in minute detail evidence for its lineage as a cohesive entity, in 
the form of widely-shared doctrinal creeds, notably the Nicene Creed, as well as common 
institutions pertaining to communion, worship, ordained ministry and so on. Such, he argues, 
are the ‘signs of a spiritual society’.45  ‘There is’, the treatise maintains, ‘a spiritual and 
universal society in the world’, namely, ‘the Kingdom of Christ’.46 
However, while ecclesiastical—and herein lies the surprise political significance of 
the book—this kingdom is also a home for the whole of humanity. Persons, Maurice reasoned, 
                                                          
43 David Reisman, ed., Democratic Socialism in Britain: Classic Texts in Economic and Political Thought 1825-
1952, Vol. 2: Frederick Denison Maurice, Charles Kingsley and John Malcolm Ludlow, the Christian Socialists 
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 1996). 
44 Frederick Denison Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. 1. (London: J.M. Dent, 1842), pp. 59-60. 
45 Ibid., p. 260. 
46 Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. 2, p. 277. 
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naturally live together, as signalled by the cultural ubiquity of the family unit. We also 
congregate naturally in the larger whole of nations. Both of these types of community are 
healthy and needful. However, there is also ‘the cry for a universal body, in which men shall 
be regarded as human beings and not merely as the members of a local society’, of which cry 
secular social movements such as Chartism, Owenism and French socialism represented 
powerful recent expressions.47 ‘But’, in Maurice’s view, 
each of these is chiefly remarkable as the shrine of a feeling which it cannot satisfy, 
and of a conviction which it labours to stifle—the feeling, I mean, that a universal 
society is needful to man; the conviction that if there be such a society, the treatment 
of man as a voluntary or a spiritual being must be the characteristic distinction of it.48 
‘It is equally impossible’, he explains, ‘for men to be content with a spiritual society 
which is not universal, and with a universal society which is not spiritual’. ‘The spiritual and 
universal society’, Maurice is then able to conclude, ‘must be involved in the very idea of our 
human constitution, say rather, must be that constitution, by virtue of which we realise that 
there is a humanity, that we form a kind’.49 
Maurice was well aware that most people do not believe a word of this. ‘It is a fact’, 
as he put it, ‘that men are living anomalously’.50 Nevertheless, the Christian community 
exists to model what life together would be like if they were not; it gives us a template. ‘The 
Church’, he recapitulated in Theological Essays, ‘is human society in its normal state; the 
World that same society irregular and abnormal’.51  The church shows how we ought to 
behave towards one another, as children of the same progenitor, and thus as siblings, a 
                                                          
47 Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. 1, p. 209. 
48 Ibid., p. 203. 
49 Ibid., p. 223. 
50 Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. 2, p. 2. 
51 Quoted in Ellen K. Wondra, ed., Reconstructing Christian Ethics, Selected Writings: F.D. Maurice 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), p. xvii. 
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brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. Like it or not, this is the ‘Divine 
constitution for man’ and the ‘unity which lies beneath all other unity’. 52  ‘As Maurice 
suggests’, comments a recent exegete, ‘the headship of Jesus Christ means [that] the 
theological imagination runs as broad and deep as humanity itself’.53 
It is this majestic spiritual-cum-political vision that the Christian socialists would 
zealously pick up in 1848. ‘Politics’, Politics for the People declared, ‘cannot be separated 
from Religion. They must start from Atheism, or from the acknowledgement that a Living 
and Righteous God is ruling in human society not less than in the natural world’.54 However, 
not all politics met theological requirements: only popular politics did so; more particularly, 
socialist politics. The Christian Socialist, as its title might suggest, was geared to making this 
link explicit. The first issue could not have been clearer: 
A new idea has gone abroad into the world. That Socialism, the latest-born of the 
forces now at work in modem society, and Christianity, the eldest-born of those 
forces, are in their nature not hostile, but akin to each other; or rather, that the one is 
but the development, outgrowth, the manifestation of the other...That Christianity, 
however feeble and torpid it may seem to many just now, is truly but as an eagle at 
moult; that Socialism is but its livery of the nineteenth century, which it is even now 
putting on, to spread ere long its wings for a broader and heavenlier flight.55 
The Christian religion had of course already been around for two millennia, but the 
idea here is that it was not until the arrival of socialism upon the world scene that 
                                                          
52 Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. 2, pp. 137, 291. 
53 P.D. Jones, ‘Jesus Christ and the Transformation of English Society: the “Subversive Conservatism” of 
Frederick Denison Maurice’, Harvard Theological Review 96: 2 (2003), 205-28 at 228.  
54 Politics for the People, ‘Prospectus’, 6 May (1848), 1-2. 
55 The Christian Socialist: A Journal of Association, ‘The New Idea’, 2 November (1850), 1. 
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Christianity’s political potential could begin to be understood and appropriated. Christian 
socialism was thus a special discovery of the nineteenth century.  
The principal element in the new fusion was the ideal of brotherhood. The first article 
in Politics, authored by Maurice, was headlined ‘Fraternity’.56 Reversing the usual sequence 
in the axiological trinity promulgated by the French Revolution, it portrayed universal 
fraternity as the basis of both liberty and equality. 57  In itself this was and is entirely 
concordant with the priorities of the political left as a whole. For example, the German 
Marxist Karl Leibknecht would later confirm that ‘the concept of general human solidarity is 
the highest cultural and moral concept; to turn it into reality is the task of socialism’.58 
However, the Christian socialist position differed profoundly in the way that it justified 
human solidarity. Non-Christian socialists were mistaken in their assumption that true 
brotherhood could be based just on self-interest or sectarian objectives in a class war. The 
Christian socialists had the real explanation: 
But because they have not found the secret, is it impossible that we should? We 
profess that we have found it long ago. We pretend to think that an Everlasting Father 
has revealed Himself to men in an elder Brother, one with him and with us, who died 
for all. We may believe this to be true or false. We believe it to be true, therefore we 
can feel to each other as brothers; we can look upon all of you whom we address in 
this paper, nobles, shopkeepers, labourers, mechanics, beggars, aristocrats, democrats, 
people of every class and party, as brothers.59 
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They are of course not making here a Wittgensteinian point about a shared father 
being part of the grammar of the concept of brotherhood. Rather, they are making the 
substantive claim that there is another world at hand, an immanent reality of true fellowship, 
into which workers, activists, indeed everyone, could and should enter—and that such is the 
ultimate foundation of socialism. As Ludlow put it in his contemporaneous tract on the 
working associations of Paris, ‘the idea—the Church idea, of universal brotherhood haunts 
these men [the Paris ouvriers]’.60 What the revolution was missing was this virtual dimension, 
the ontological connection that binds us all together in an indefeasible familial network.  
In such a way, the Christian socialists sought to ‘Christianize socialism’ and ‘socialize 
Christianity’.61 Socialism would be saved from the materialistic and sectarian tendencies it 
was displaying, especially on the Continent, and Christianity from the pietism and 
individualism to which it had been reduced. However, while they were convinced that their 
new synthesis was definitive, the Christian socialists were not so cultish as to insist that 
progressive efforts as a whole should be suspended until the general adoption of their 
worldview. They preached their message to all, as any believer would, but at the same time 
they readily worked with Fourierists, Owenites and other well-meaning groups on the left, of 
all religious persuasions and none. They sought to gather together as many people as possible 
through what ‘Parson Lot’, that is, Charles Kingsley, called ‘the power of mere 
brotherhood’.62 Theirs was thus an ‘ethico-inclusive solidarity’,63 a fraternal message framed 
in explicit moral language, and aimed at everyone. If few knew the secret—that the 
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brotherhood of man can be traced back to the fatherhood of God, the ‘All-father’,64 and that 
socialism is, therefore, in its final analysis, ordained—that was regrettable but not fatal. In 
the language of analytical political philosophy, we might now say that brotherhood can be 
deployed standalone as a ‘thin’ concept, while being ultimately supported by a ‘thick’ 
structure of metaphysics.  
The Christian socialists not only propagated an original and highly attractive doctrine 
of brotherhood, they also tested its feasibility in organizational forms, specifically, worker 
co-operatives. While co-operation had been pioneered in the previous generation by Robert 
Owen and others, the Christian socialists were largely responsible for its revival in the 1850s 
and 1860s. They conceived of it in black-and-white terms, as the antithesis of the 
competitiveness at the heart of industrial capitalism. ‘Anyone’, Maurice asserted, ‘who 
recognises the principle of co-operation as a stronger and truer principle than that of 
competition has a right to the honour or the disgrace of being called a Socialist’.65 The 
Christian socialists accordingly set up a Society for Promoting Working Men’s Associations, 
which registered and funded a network of small co-operatives, in trades such as needlework, 
tailoring and baking. This alternative approach, the Christian socialists believed, ‘creates new 
ties between man and man, [and] suggests new forms of fellowship…[whereby] there is 
literally evolved a new type of working man’.66 Co-operation’s intrinsic ethical and economic 
advantages were supposedly so self-evident that it would become an unstoppable grassroots 
movement. ‘Growing’, as Hughes and Neale’s retrospective cast it, ‘over against the present 
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state as the Church did of old, only now under its shelter instead of in conflict with it’, it 
would eventually ‘create a new social state’.67  
Needless to say, the co-operative commonwealth did not materialize; none of the 
associations even survived. For their critics, this was to be expected. ‘From the first’, wrote 
the astute Beatrice Webb, ‘they ignored exactly those facts which Robert Owen realized; they 
overlooked the fundamental changes brought about by the industrial revolution’.68 The new 
mode of production was about large-scale operations, expert management and collectivist 
organization. Instead, busying themselves at the microlevel with merry little bands of tailors 
and the like, the Christian socialists blinded themselves to ‘the significant fact that genuine 
associations of producers, owning the capital and controlling the enterprise of their 
establishment, exist only in those trades untransformed by the industrial revolution’.69 It was 
a fair criticism. A century’s hindsight would confirm that ‘what was lacking [in the Christian 
socialists’ position] was a philosophy of history and an outline of the method to be used for 
the realization of the new order’.70 Or as a more recent commentator puts it, the Christian 
socialists of 1848 ‘did not show any awareness of the macroeconomic issues involved when 
discussing the unequal distribution of wealth and power’.71 
However, several points may be offered in their defence. They were the first to intuit 
the affinity between Christianity and socialism. They were also, I am suggesting, persuasive 
in their case for brotherhood as God’s will for human relations, not just in Christendom but 
the entire world. To be sure, they were naive about the viability of worker co-operatives as a 
practical expression of such, but they learned their lesson and eventually switched to 
                                                          
67 Thomas Hughes and Edward V. Neale, eds, Foundations: A Study in the Ethics and Economics of the Co-
operative Movement, 2nd edn (Manchester: The Co-operative Union, 1916 [1879]), p. 102. 
68 Beatrice Webb, The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain, 2nd edn (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1904), 
p. 167. 
69 Ibid., p. 168. 
70 G.K. Lewis, ‘The Ideas of the Christian Socialists of 1848’, The Western Political Quarterly, 4:3 (1951), 397-
429 at 416. 
71 Jones, ‘Jesus Christ and the Transformation’, 224. 
20 
 
consumer co-operatives, taking prominent roles in the Co-operative Wholesale Society and 
the Co-operative Congress.72 That kind of ‘co-op’ was of course phenomenally successful, 
and is still a major and growing presence across the globe. The Christian socialists also 
incarnated ‘mere brotherhood’ in trade unions, another permanent pillar of the social 
infrastructure, not to mention their founding of the Working Men’s College in London, the 
world’s first adult education college and again still going. Moreover, the Christian socialists 
of 1848 inspired later generations of Christian socialists who did understand the industrial 
revolution—the very term was coined by a Christian socialist, Arnold Toynbee73—and who 
therefore saw clearly the need for more collectivism.74 By the middle of the twentieth century, 
indeed, Christian socialists such as R.H. Tawney were fighting campaigns for redistributive 
taxation, nationalized utilities and other mainstays of modern macroeconomic policy, and still 
doing so under the sign of ‘socialism as fellowship’.75  
The crucial point in all this is that the Christian socialists’ mission was primarily 
spiritual, in the special sense of disseminating without restriction the spirit of brotherhood. 
They differed themselves over formats, what the era called ‘machinery’, but were at one on 
their end, namely, the transformation of society along ecclesial lines. Edward Norman, their 
most distinguished modern critic, is thus accurate when he notes that their approach was at 
bottom ‘non-ideological’,76 where ideology is understood as a mode of purely political belief. 
The Christian socialists essentially functioned on a higher plane. It does not really matter that 
they sometimes drew incorrect institutional conclusions from their political theology. What 
they succeeded in demonstrating was that the ideal of the brotherhood of man under the 
                                                          
72 Backstrom, Christian Socialism and Co-operation, passim. 
73 Bell, Coming, p. xii. 
74 Peter D’A. Jones, The Christian Socialist Revival 1877–1914: Religion, Class, and Social Conscience in Late-
Victorian England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). 
 
75 Ross Terrill, R.H. Tawney and his Times: Socialism as Fellowship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1973). 
76 Norman, Victorian Christian Socialists, p. 183. 
21 
 
fatherhood of God could unite people and stimulate genuine reform. The issue was not 
techniques but the primacy of fellowship, still surely the hallmark of any desirable socialism. 
In this basic sense, then, the new social state that the Christian socialists wanted is never, 
pace Webb and other agnostics, ‘past praying for’.77 
Towards a normative reconstitution of network society  
The major premise of this article has been Castells’ account of the rise of network society as 
the prevalent social form of the information epoch, including his claim about the problematic 
consequences for an excluded periphery. It argued that Castells fails to show how the 
potential of the new ‘logic’ of networking can be harnessed as a social force for good. 
Whatever the merits of the grassroots networks to which he has commendably devoted much 
of his career, most people do not belong to them, mainly because they are too busy earning an 
honest living to partake in such causes. Thus, a realistic approach to the conflict identified by 
Castells requires an appeal to something lying beyond the limited and divergent horizons of 
particularistic identities. This final section contains a solution built on the theological 
tradition just presented. 
At one level, the problem seems to throw up an obvious solution: network society 
requires a new brand of human connectivity generated by and for itself. Moreover, just such a 
mode, namely ‘network sociality’, has already emerged, as Andreas Wittel has shown. 
Typified by the far-flung contacts that young professionals often construct, network sociality 
tends to be ephemeral rather than permanent, and dynamic rather than static; its 
communications are more informational than narrational, brief updates rather than deep 
conversations. Wittel sees this form of (tele)connectivity replacing the physical bonding of 
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the industrial era, and broadly welcomes it.78 However, while network sociality represents a 
useful start, it is hardly sufficient. It captures a vital aspect of a demassified, post-industrial 
scenario of rapidly-interacting agents, but lacks the essential embeddedness of normal human 
experience. The task remains of somehow making the denizens of cyberspace and their 
offline lifeworlds more than just nodes in a network, of putting real flesh on the skeleton of 
the global information infrastructure. 
The only resource capable of thus transmuting thin links into thick is the recognition 
that individuals are inalienably connected at some kind of ontological level. My claim then is 
that the Christian socialist ideal of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God 
comprises a compelling expression of that valuable resource. This ideal is not, like Castells’ 
project identity, elective nor, like Wittels’ network sociality, accidental. It denotes a 
primordial human identity, one that underpins all parochial perspectives and contingencies. It 
is there whether we know it or not, a necessary, universal relatedness into which humanity is 
hardwired, and which is able thereby to counteract the abstract instrumentalism that Castells 
imputes to the net. 
The insistent objection will be that Christian socialism represents too slender a 
platform upon which to sustain any universal ethic. Castells himself claims that Christianity 
is ‘a minority religion that is bound to lose its pre-eminence in the multiculturalism that will 
characterize the twenty-first century’. Ergo, bluntly, the information society ‘cannot be built 
around Christianity’.79 However, to reiterate: such an argument misconstrues the case that is 
being sketched here. The Christian socialists’ seminal contribution consisted in their 
pioneering of a unique synthesis between the spiritual idea of God’s fatherhood and the 
political idea of fraternity. However, that is not to deny ‘the multiplication of the sources of 
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normativity in highly functionally differentiated societies’.80 The way that brotherhood is 
expressed will inevitably vary across cultures and other variables. Yet people everywhere can 
embrace the brotherhood of man as an ideal, even if they reject its ultimate legitimation in the 
fatherhood of the Christian God. The peculiarity of the prescription’s origin does not matter, 
any more than it matters to present-day patients that penicillin happens to have been first 
isolated on a mouldy laboratory bench in St Mary’s Hospital, Paddington, one blessed day in 
1928. 
This 1848 normative software, therefore, can and should be reloaded in the 
information age. To fulfil a contemporary role, however, some adjustments will be necessary. 
‘Mere brotherhood’ was of course never about males alone, but the term does nominally 
excommunicate half of humanity; ‘sisterhood’ too. The natural compromise is ‘siblinghood’. 
That—spiritual consanguinity—is the essential relation which needs to be recognized. 
Kingsley’s potent phrase might thus be updated to ‘simple siblinghood’. However, while 
inoffensive the latter has obvious limitations as a rallying-cry. I propose, therefore, that we 
adopt ‘fellowship’, a word which the Christian socialists used more or less interchangeably 
with ‘brotherhood’ and ‘fraternity’. While it too may have suffered male overtones in the past, 
these are hardly significant now: females have long enjoyed academic fellowships and 
qualified as equal members of medical fellowships. The term has a welcome collegial as well 
as ecclesial air; but more importantly, it captures to a sufficient extent the underlying idea of 
brotherhood, without being open to a charge of being politically incorrect. So what I am 
advocating is an ideal of fellowship for the network society—in short, the fellowship of the 
net.  
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The ethic must be inclusive in another basic sense. We saw how the Mauricean vision 
of a worldwide fellowship expressly avoided any hint of the annihilation of natural identities. 
While the individual should see herself as part of a universal body, she remains a member of 
a family, a nation and a politically- and culturally-shaped set of intermediate collectivities, 
what today are called civil society organizations. Fellowship is part of the rationale of all 
natural human combinations and largely co-extensive with their ethical kernel, even that of 
many Castellsian perverse connections, as in the mafia’s code of loyalty, for example. The 
fellowship of the net must thus be multilayered, its spiritual kingdom of nodes built upon and 
subsuming, while simultaneously transcending, the more intense ties of local and immediate 
situations. As we are told ad nauseam, the postmodern settlement mandates the incorporation 
of ethnic, cultural and other forms of difference. In formal terms, then, to refresh the 
paradigm of universal siblinghood necessitates enshrinement of a built-in principle of 
subsidiarity. In this sense the ethic is gradualist, not only in being politically reformist rather 
than revolutionary, but also in accommodating Wittel’s network sociality and all other 
ontologically lower grades of human connectivity. 
There needs, of course, to be a conviction that such a fellowship is workable. As 
noted above, the Fabian historian denied that the then new unit of industrial plants could be a 
meaningful site of fraternal relations. Scalability is what Wilson McWilliams was 
problematizing too, when his magisterial Idea of Fraternity concluded sternly that ‘under 
modern conditions, general political fraternity is impossible’.81 He added, however, that we 
can ‘attempt to provide the greatest approximations possible’: such efforts are made possible 
by the existence of ‘the “inner city”’, since ‘such a fraternal city can exist within an 
unfraternal polity’.82 In other words, although macrostructures might be unsupportive, human 
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fellowship can still flourish in the interior world of personal relationships. The Christian 
socialist tradition agrees, venturing the further proposition that this inner city is actually—
could we but see it—the kingdom of God. Precisely because it is such, fellowship can and 
should be pursued in the outer, sociopolitical world, using as a proven template the actually 
existing church. And that goal has now become much more reachable, as a result of the 
technological means accompanying the rise of the network society. 
What then are the practical implications of a network society reconstituted along such 
lines? It might be thought that the answer must be the installation of co-operative institutions, 
the main nostrum, as we saw, of the Christian socialists themselves. Many leftists attuned to 
post-industrial times still talk that way. ‘We are’, advises Christian Fuchs, for example, 
‘already witnessing a shift from a largely competitive mode of society to a more co-operative 
one’.83 Elsewhere, he turns this into an eternal truth: a ‘true’ information society must be co-
operative, because only such is compatible with the ‘real’ nature of information as a ‘public 
good’.84 In a similar vein, Nick Dyer-Witheford calls for a ‘noncapitalist commonwealth’ 
based on co-operation. 85  However, the plain lesson of twentieth- as well as nineteenth-
century history was that producer co-operatives do not succeed. Isolated experiments might 
work for a season, but co-operative commonwealth 2.0 is as much a mirage as was co-
operative commonwealth 1.0. Moreover, even if such a monopoly form were possible, it is 
not desirable. The Christian socialists oversimplified in depicting socialism and competition 
as mutually exclusive, as their own famous predilection for sports like rugby and boxing 
proved. Brothers can compete, if they play fair. Thus, a private economy in certain industries, 
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including high tech, can be part of the solution, on condition that these are designed to fit 
inside an overarching social framework imbued with the spirit of fellowship. 
While compatible to some extent with market forces, however, the fellowship of the 
net is at odds with our harsh neoliberal hegemony. The Christian socialists of 1848 bravely 
confronted a ‘new world’ involving ‘a vast class of novel evils along with the benefits of the 
manufacturing system’; 86  we must do likewise with the evils as well as benefits of 
informationalism. They improved the condition of ‘those who work, chiefly with their 
muscles…for wages’;87 we must address the condition of information labour, those who 
chiefly process data with their minds. The brotherhood of man contained a message of 
outrage and hope for the poor and destitute; the fellowship of the net must offer the 
equivalent to the post-industrial paupers inhabiting Castells’ fourth world. Lawrence Wilde is 
correct that only a gospel of ethico-inclusive solidarity can ‘break the divisive dominance of 
neoliberalism’;88 that is why its revival is a matter of urgency. 
Fair background institutions will thus need to continue serving as the offline 
infrastructure. However, the information age calls also for something innovative. This returns 
us to where we began. It is precisely as a result of advances in information and 
communication technologies, and especially the world wide web, that a new fraternal 
consciousness has at last become an achievable aim. Facebook, LinkedIn and other apps now 
populating the ‘network of networks’89 have led the way in demonstrating that it is possible 
to make human connectivity scalable. They have read the times well, tapping into people’s 
evolving curiosity and sociability, enabling an unprecedented transcending of geographical, 
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racial, gender, generational and other barriers. However, commercial systems cannot bear the 
burden of the interlinking of humankind. Whatever their rhetoric, their real goal is, and has to 
be, profit. Hence the task for the twenty-first century becomes obvious. It is to develop public 
online platforms that are stable and capacious enough to facilitate the integration of a highly-
networked but centrifugal global information society. The future will surely reveal their exact 
technical form;90 a new version of the nineteenth-century value of fellowship can supply the 
requisite spiritual content. In short, network society needs to rediscover the ‘secret’ 
interconnectedness of humankind, and then invent ways of implementing it. Such would 
constitute the long-overdue second life of mere brotherhood. 
Conclusion 
This article has attempted an articulation of two temporally and intellectually removed bodies 
of thought, the social theory of the network society and the political philosophy of religious 
socialism. More specifically, it has sought to solve the problem referred to by Castells as the 
‘bipolar opposition between the net and the self’, through a reapplication of the Christian 
socialist doctrine of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. It suggested that 
Castells himself cannot solve his own problem, because the movements to which he appeals 
comprise too narrow a base for a solution. The diseased social morphology that he has 
usefully reported requires an ontological-level response, and the doctrine of the universal 
constitution of human siblinghood, updated for the information age as the fellowship of the 
net, fits the bill. I am recommending, therefore, that the formula of the fellowship of the net 
be injected into relevant public deliberations and policies, in the tradition of what John 
Marsden calls ‘the marshalling of theological resources for sustaining a vision for social 
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democracy in our own generation’. 91  Some will no doubt scoff at such a left-field 
intervention, but can citizens who are really in earnest about securing a less divided future 
afford to spurn any help at all? 
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